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RECENT DECISIONS.
CONTRACrS-RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARY.-The bridge which car-
ried Columbia Street, City of Rensselaer, on which plaintiff's
premises abutted, over defendant's railroad tracks, being out of
repair, defendant and the City entered into a contract under seal
providing for the repairing of the bridge and the raising of the
grade of the approaches thereto. Said contract provided among
other things that defendant would pay any damages resulting to
property from the change of grade of such street. The grade of
Columbia Street was raised accordingly and plaintiff's property
was materially damaged thereby. In a suit against the railroad
company to recover compensation for such damage, Held, That,
although he had no claim against the City therefor, plaintiff could
recover such damages under the provisions of the contract between
defendant and the City, on the theory of Lawrence v. Fox. (Rig-
ney v. N. Y. C. Railroad, N. Y. Court of Appeals, Law journal,
February 5, 1916.)
It has been held in New York that a party may sue on a prom-
ise not made to him when the promisee owed him a legal duty to
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do the thing promised. (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 268.) This
doctrine applies equally to contracts under seal. (Coster v. The
Mayor, 43 N. Y. 399.) "The party suing upon the promise, in
cases like Lawrence v. Fox, is in truth asserting a derivative right".
(Dunning v. Leavitt, 85 N. Y. 30, 35.) The adopted promise is
subject to any assault which the promisor can make upon its val-
idity. (Arnold v. Nichols, 64 N. Y. 117.) It has not been decided
that the beneficiary's right in the contract vests before he brings
suit upon it. (Gifford v. Corrigan, 117 N. Y. 257.) The legal or
equitable duty which the promisee owes the beneficiary must relate
to the subject matter of the contract. (Durnherr v. Rau, 135 N. Y.
219; Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N. Y. 280.) That line of obligation
would seem to be lacking in the principal case. It was found dis-
tinctly that the plaintiff had no claim against the City for his dam-
ages. The opinion argues that the municipality is under some
obligation to protect its inhabitants when it enters into a contract
for public work, which may result in damage to one of them, for
which otherwise he would be without remedy. But that is a moral
obligation. Moreover, the duty of the city to protect its inhabitants
here would appear to be rather to the inhabitants generally to pro-
vide a safe bridge and approaches, than to the particular class to
which plaintiff belonged to compensate them for damages from
a change of grade. The early tendency to restrict Lawrence v.
Fox (see the odd case of Wheat v. Rice, 97 N. Y. 296, never in
terms overruled) has, it is true, been done away with by the later
cases. (Pond v. The Water Co., 183 N. Y. 330; Gulla v. Barton,
164 App. Div: 293.) But even in Pond v. The Water Co., supra,
the line of legal obligation might be found. (Smyth v. City of
New York, 203 N. Y. 106, 114, 115.)
A sole beneficiary is one solely interested in a pecuniary way
in the performance of the promise. Not as to the whole contract,
of course, but as to the particular promise under which he sued,
plaintiff in the principal case was a sole beneficiary; he alone was'
pecuniarily interested in its being carried out. With one excep-
tion, no sole beneficiary has recovered in New York, except a
dependent relative of the promisee. (Buchanan v. Tilden, 158
N. Y. 109.) That exceptional case stands apart in that on its facts
and decision a sole beneficiary other than a dependent relative
of the promisee was allowed to recover. (Todd v. Weber, 95
N. Y. 181.) The opinion, however, apparently went on the de-
pendent relative theory, in that it cited Dutton v. Poole (2 Levinzs
210; since overruled in England by Tweddle v. Atkinson, 1 Best
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& Smith 393), and it has been so explained in a later case.
(Smyth v. City of New York, supra, at p. 113.) The principal
case has the result, therefore, of allowing a sole beneficiary to
recover under Lawrence v. Fox.
There is a third line of decisions in New York apart from
either of the theories just discussed. It is what might be termed
the public policy doctrine and is represented by Little v. Banks,
85 N. Y. 258, and noted as a second ground of decision in Smyth
v. City of New York, supra. This renders contractors with the
State, who assume for a consideration received from the sovereign
power, by covenant, express or implied, to do certain things, liable,
in case of neglect to perform such covenant, to a private action
at the suit of the party injured by such neglect. The principal case
would appear sound under this last rule, apart entirely from
Lawrence v. Fox. The opinion, however, does not discuss this
point.
SALES-VENDOR'S LIEN-Loss THEREOF PY TRANSFER OF
NEGOTIABLE WAREHOUSE REcEipTs.-Plaintiffs having by indorse-
ment transferred negotiable warehouse receipts to vendees, who
thereafter became insolvent, sue in replevin to regain the mer-
chandise; Held, that the transfer of the warehouse receipts operated
as a transfer of possession and title to goods therein described,
divesting plaintiffs of their unpaid vendor's lien; hence replevin
would not lie. (Rummell v. Blanchard, 216 N. Y. 348.)
At common law warehouse receipts and dock warrants were
not fully recognized as documents of title and the indorsements
thereof had not "any effect beyond that of a token of an authority
to receive possession." (Blackburn, Sales, 2d ed., 415, 418; see
also, McEwan v. Smith, 2 H. L. G. 309; Griffiths v. Perry, 1 E. &
E. 680; Sanders v. MacLean, 11 Q. B. D. 327, 341.) By statute,
however, no distinction is now made between warehouse receipts
and bills of lading, both being equally recognized as documents
of title. (Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act, secs. 37-41; In re
Reichheimer, 221 Fed. 16.)
In many jurisdictions, and for some time prior to statute in
New York, the transfer of a warehouse receipt, without the ware-
houseman's consent to become bailee for the vendee, had the effect
of changing title only, the possession being left undisturbed and
the warehouseman remaining bailee of the vendor. (Williston
on Sales, p. 739 and cases cited; also, Selliger v. Kentucky, 213
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U. S. 200, 205; Union Trust Co. & S. W. Co. v. Wilson, 198 id.
530, 536.) But since legislative enactment in New York (July
25, 1907), the warehouseman who issues a negotiable receipt agrees
in advance to hold the goods for the account of any person to
whom the receipt is negotiated and by the very act of negotiation
loses his position as bailee for the vendor and is transformed with-
out further assent, into bailee for the transferee. (General Business
Law, sec. 125; N. Y. Consol. Laws, ch. 20.) Where the receipt
issued is non-negotiable, the warehouseman does not become the
bailee for the transferee of the receipt, until notice of the transfer.
(General Business Law, sec. 126.)
Plaintiffs therefore, by transferring their negotiable warehouse
receipts, completely divested themselves of both title and pos-
session to the goods which they now seek in replevin, and with the
passing ,of possession, lost their lien as unpaid vendors. (N. Y.
Consol. Laws, ch. 41, Pers. Prop. Law, Sec. 137.) The decision,
holding that replevin cannot be maintained, appears sound.
"SCINTILLA" RULE-WHEN CASE MUST BE SUBMITTED TO
JURY.-In an action to recover for personal injuries caused by de-
fendant's negligence the plaintiff had a verdict. The Court denied
the defendant's motion for a new trial. On appeal, the Appellate
Division dismissed the complaint on the ground that plaintiff was
guilty of contributory negligence as matter of law. The Court of
Appeals, upon examination of the evidence, Held that the questions
of defendant's negligence and plaintiff's freedom from contributory
negligence were properly submitted to the jury and therefore the
dismissal of the complaint was error. But the appellant was en-
titled to have the Appellate Division pass upon the facts and the
weight of evidence. Since this was not done the case must be re-
mitted for that purpose. (Rowe v. Hendricks, 216 N. Y. Memo 76.)
It is apparent from this decision that the Court of Appeals has
reaffirmed the doctrine of McDonald v. Met. St. Ry. Co. (167
N. Y. 66) which, it was believed, the Matter of Case (214 N. Y.
199) had intended to discard.
The early rule in New York, the "SCINTILLA" RULE, sup-
ported by a long line of decisions (Stuart v. Simpson, 1 Wend.
376; Rudd v. Davis, 3 Hill 287; McMartin v. Taylor, 2 Barb. 356;
People v. Cook, 14 Barb. 259), had its last enunciation in Linkhauf
v. Lombard (137 N. Y. 417), Hemmens v. Nelson (138 N. Y.
517) and Laidlaw v. Sage (158 N. Y. 73). "Where there is no
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evidence upon an issue or the weight of evidence is so decidedly
preponderating in favor of one side that a verdict contrary to it
would be set aside, it is the duty of the trial judge to nonsuit or
direct a verdict as the case may require". Thus the right to non-
suit or direct a verdict was measured by the right to set aside the
verdict as against the weight of evidence. This rule was changed
by McDonald v. Met. St. Ry. Co., supra. "We think it cannot
be correctly said in any case where the right of trial by jury
exists and the evidence presents an actual issue of fact that the
Court may direct a verdict. So long as a question of fact exists,
it is for the jury and not for the Court. If the evidence is insuf-
ficient, or if that which has been introduced is conclusively an-
swered, so that, as a matter of law, no question of credibility or
issue of fact remains, then the question being one of law, it is the
duty of the Court to determine it. But whenever the plaintiff has
established facts which would justify a finding of fact in his favor,
the right to have the issue of fact determined by a jury continues
and the cause must ultimately be submitted to it". Under this
rule, the fact that the weight of evidence clearly preponderates in
favor of one side will not justify the Court in withdrawing the
case from the jury, provided an actual issue of fact is raised.
(See McConnell v. N. Y. Central R. R., 63 App. Div. 548.) Yet
it may be reversible error for the Court to refuse to set aside, as
against the weight of evidence, a verdict based upon facts which
it would have been reversible error to refuse to submit to the
jury. "The learned trial Justice was justified in submitting to the
jury the question of plaintiff's freedom from contributory negli-
gence, but the jury was not justified in finding as a fact that she
had sustained the burden of proof in that regard. The verdict
of the jury should have been set aside by the trial Court upon this
ground". (Weill v. City of N. Y., 148 App. Div. 919.) The
result of this rule is that the trial Court must set aside successive
verdicts until the jury returns a verdict in accordance with the
weight of the evidence. The folly of the rule has been rec-
ognized and somewhat remedied by holding that even where the
Court still considers the verdict as contrary to the weight
of evidence, if repeated verdicts are handed down for the
same party on the same proofs, the Court will yield its
opinion to the reiterated conviction of the jury. (McCann v. N. Y.
etc. R. R., 73 App. Div. 305; Lachs v. Everards, 95 N. Y. Supp.
25.)
The recent decision of Matter of Case, supra, intimates that the
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McDonald case never changed the rule. It quotes with approval
the words of Maule, J., in Jewell v. Parr (13 C. B. 916), setting
forth the English rule, which was in accord with the early New
York rule. "'When we say that there is no evidence to go to a
jury we do not mean that there is literally none, but that there is
none which ought reasonably to satisfy a jury that the fact sought
to be proved is established.' Rightly read, the case of McDonald v.
Met. St. Ry. Co. (167 N. Y. 66) holds nothing to the contrary".
It adopts, as the prevailing rule, the language of cases prior to the
McDonald case, holding that "insufficient evidence is, in the eye
of the law, no evidence". (Pollock v. Pollock, 71 N. Y. 137.)
The expression "insufficient evidence" as used in the McDonald
case does not mean the same as was meant by Maule, J. In the
former case, it means insufficient to raise an actual issue of fact;
in the latter it means insufficient to satisfy twelve reasonable men
that the fact sought to be proved is established. (Ryder v. Womb-
well, 4 Ex. 32; Thayer's Cases on Evidence, p. 151.) The two are
not the same test. If "rightly read", the McDonald case means by
insufficient evidence what Maule, J., means, then the rule never
was changed.
The principal case (as also Martin v. Crumb, 216 N. Y. at p.
506) reaffirms the McDonald rule. The Court of Appeals ex-
pressly finds that the defendant's negligence and plaintiff's free-
dom from contributory negligence were properly submitted to the
jury. This is a finding that there was "an actual issue of fact".
The dismissal of the complaint was therefore error, but the weight
of evidence was still for the Court's consideration. Hence, the
case is remitted to have the Appellate Division pass upon the facts
and the weight of evidence with a view to sustaining or setting
aside the verdict. In other words, the Court applies the "actual
issue of fact" test and declares that the right to nonsuit or direct
a verdict is not measured by the right to set aside the verdict as
against the weight of evidence. It would be hard to conceive a
stronger application of the McDonald case. It is to be regretted
that the hope held out by Matter of Case is not to be realized.
LIEN LAW-CHATTEL MORTGAGES-NoTIcE.-One Fleming, re-
tiring from a partnership with White, conveyed to plaintiff at
White's request, a safe, by a bill of sale which, though absolute
upon its face, was intended to operate merely as security for the
payment of certain notes made by White to the plaintiff. The
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instrument was filed pursuant to the provisions of Article 10 of
the Lien Law. Nothing was filed therewith to indicate that it
was intended to be a chattel mortgage and not an absolute bill of
sale, and the agreement so to regard it was never reduced to
writing. White thereafter traded the safe for a new one with the
Carey Safe Company, through whom defendants derived title. In
an action for conversion against the defendant purchasers, Held,
that plaintiff could recover; that a bill of sale absolute upon its
face, but intended to operate only as a mortgage, and filed pursuant
to Article 10 of the Lien Law, is notice to a subsequent purchaser
in good faith, it being unnecessary that any instrument expressing
such an intention be filed therewith. (Sheldon v. McFee, New
York Court of Appeals, N. Y. Law Journal, Jan. 26, 1916.)
A mortgage of goods may be valid between the parties without
a writing. (Bank of Rochester v. Jones, 4 N. Y. 497.) So too,
a conveyance, absolute upon its face, may be shown by parol or
extrinsic evidence to be in reality merely a security. (Barry v.
Colville, 129 N. Y. 302.) But a mortgage of personalty must be
filed where the rights of creditors and purchasers in good faith are
concerned. (Bank of Rochester v. Jones, supra.) By the pro-
visions of the Lien Law (Chap. 33, Art. 10, Sec. 233), "every
mortgage or conveyance intended to operate as a mortgage of
goods and chattels which is not accompanied by an immediate
delivery and followed by an actual and continued change of pos-
session of the things mortgaged, is absolutely void as against the
creditors of the mortgagor, and as against subsequent purchasers
in good faith, unless the mortgage, or a true copy thereof, is filed
as directed in this article". The provision of the law is a salutary
one made for the protection of creditors and subsequent purchasers
in good faith. The object of the filing is to give notice of its
existence to all persons who choose to inspect it, and when prop-
erly filed it is legal presumptive notice, binding on all persons
interested. The case under review stands for the proposition that
any conveyance filed pursuant to Article 10 of the Lien Law, is
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser, provided-the parties
intended to regard the instrument as a chattel mortgage. It does
not matter whether the expression of this intention be filed or not
filed, be written or oral. The extrinsic agreement forms no part
of the instrument required to be filed. (Preston v. Southwick,
115 N. Y. 139.) The filing of a bill of sale, absolute upon its face,
without any defeasance clause and without any accompanying in-
strument importing a defeasance, is held a good and fair filing so
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as to convey to the world notice of the rights of the mortgagee.
It is submitted that this is an extension of the doctrine of notice,
bordering upon unfairness to subsequent purchasers in good faith.
The requirement that there be filed with the conveyance intended
to operate as a mortgage, not necessarily every writing explanatory
of its being designed to have such an effect, but at least some
writing indicative of such intention, would appear to be not unrea-
sonable.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-PROVISIONS OF POWER OF ATTORNEY
CONSTRUED-AUTHORITY TO EXECUTE NOTE-RATIFICATION BY
AN ADMINISTRATOR OF AN ACT PREVIOUSLY DONE BY HIM AS
AGENT.-Action brought to recover $20,000 on a promissory note
signed by Alexander McDonald, by Edmund Stallo, as attorney,
and payable to one Keyes. McDonald had given Stallo in 1907
a power of attorney which provided substantially as follows:
"For me and in my name . . . to collect all debts
due or to become due . ; to collect and receive all
dividends on stock, etc., held by me; to collect rents
and to give valid receipts, etc., for money received
for me; to make, sign, execute and deliver for me . . .
all bills of exchange, promissory notes and other evidences
of indebtedness; to sell, transfer and assign all personal
property, etc., which I own . .; to guarantee payment
of promissory notes, etc., of any company in which I may
be or become a stockholder; and generally in the sole man-
agement of my personal property and in other matters above
mentioned to do and perform everything which I could
do "
In 1910 Stallo purchased for McDonald certain stock and gave
McDonald's note in payment therefor. McDonald died and Stallo,
while acting as sole administrator, included note on which this
action is brought as a liability of McDonald's estate. Defendant
was subsequently appointed co-administrator and on retirement of
Stallo became sole administrator. Defendant refused to pay the
note, setting up as a defense to the action that the power of attor-
ney given to Stallo did not authorize him to execute the note in
question. In the lower court plaintiff recovered; on appeal, Held,
That Stallo under the power of attorney had no authority to exe-
cute the note, and the fact that Stallo, while acting as adminis-
trator, included the note in an inventory, did not make it an obliga-
tion of the estate. (Keyes v. Metropolitan Trust Co., 169 App.
Div. 765.)
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A power of attorney must specifically set out each special power
meant to be conferred and no power will be implied except those
requisite for the complete fulfillment of the principal's declared
intention, that is, to do those ancillary acts which it is natural to
suppose the principal himself would do. (MacKenzie on Powers
of Attorney (1913) page 33; Lesem v. Mutual Life Insurance
Company, 164 App. Div. 507.) The power to give promissory
notes and other evidences of indebtedness does not imply the
power to create indebtedness not already existing (Craighead v.
Peterson, 72 N. Y. 279; Nash v. Mitchell, 71 N. Y. 199), and the
authorities show that the words relating to the issue of promissory
notes and the general words at the end of the power of attorney
are not to be construed so as to enlarge the substantive powers
conferred on the attorney. (Rossiter v. Rossiter, 8 Wend. 494;
First National Bank v. Bean, 141 Wis. 476.) Where one gives in
the name of his principal a note which he was not authorized to
sign as agent for the principal, the agent himself is personally
liable (Fulton v. Sewall, 116 App. Div. 744; Rossiter v. Rossiter,
8 Wend. 492; Heyran v. Caspery, 117 N. Y. Supp. 966). Evi-
dence of the acts and admissions of one of several co-administra-
tors is not receivable to affect the others or the estate. (Bailey v.
Spofford, 79 N. Y. 415; Finnern v. Hinz, 38 Hun 465; Greenleaf
on Evidence, Vol. 1, Sec. 176.) We submit that the decision herein
is sustained both on principle and authority.
JUDGMENTS-LIEN ON REALTY-ISSUANCE OF EXECUTION IN-
EFFECTUAL TO CHANGE PARITY OF SIMULTANEOUS JUDGMENT
LIENS. After the due docketing of three successive judgments
against a single defendant, an estate in realty in that county de-
scended to "him, admittedly resulting in simultaneous liens thereon
in favor of the three judgment creditors. Subsequently one of
these three issued an execution under which the property was sold,
whereupon the other two judgment creditors brought proceedings
to establish their rights to respective thirds in the property, the
judgment debtor being insolvent. Held, that, since the judgments
were liens without the issuance of execution, the admitted parity
of the three liens against the inherited realty was not affected by
the subsequent issuance of execution, and that the proceeds of
sale thereunder was a common fund for the three judgment
creditors. (Hulbert v. Hulbert, 216 N. Y. 430.)
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This decision changes the rule that has obtained for over a
hundred years in this State. The law as announced in Adams v.
Dyer, 8 Johns. 347, and Waterman v. Haskin, 11 Johns. 288, has
been recognized and followed not only in this State'but in many
other jurisdictions. (Elston v. Castor, 101 Ind. 426; Gimbel v.
Stolte, 59 Ind. 446, 451; Smith v. Lind, 29 Ill. 24; Bruce v. Vogel,
38 Mo. 100, 106; Bliss v. Watkins, 16 Ala. 229 (citing the two
new York cases, supra), Lippencott etc. v. Wilson, 40 Iowa, 425
(held not to apply to after-acquired property in Kisterson v. Tate,
94 Iowa 665, although it is difficult to see any reason for the dis-
tinction). Leading text-writers have subscribed to the same
doctrine. (2 Freeman on Judgments (4th ed.) Sec. 374; Rorer on
Judicial Sales, Sec. 703; A. & E. Encycl. of L., 2nd ed., vol. 17,
p. 796.) Thus it is clear that the doctrine is not peculiar to New
York.
Judge Seabury writing the prevailing opinion in which Chase,
Collin and Hogan, Jr., concurred, reviewing the statutes and au-
thorities, both English and American, relating to the acquisition
and perfecting of judgment liens upon real property, concludes
that prior to the enactment of Chapter 50 of the Laws of 1813, the
law was not settled in this State as to the status of a judgment
duly docketed. That statute was the first to declare specifically
that "the said judgment shall be a lien on such land, etc." Hence,
Adams v. Dyer, supra, and Waterman v. Haskins, supra, had
under consideration judgments docketed before the enactment of
that statute and the court was justified in deciding that something
more than merely docketing the judgment was necessary before
the lien would be perfected. Since the enactment of the statute
it is clear that a judgment becomes a lien immediately upon being
duly docketed, or in the case of after-acquired property when the
property came into the hands of the judgment debtor and hence
the performance by one judgment creditor of an unnecessary act
should not give his lien priority.
Chief Justice Bartlett in a strong dissenting opinion, in which
Cuddeback and Pound, JJ., concurred, insists that there was no
reason for reversing such a long established precedent. He calls
attention to the Adams and Waterman caseg, in both of which
the Court said that the judgments were liens. While it is true
that no statute before that of 1813 specifically expressed that a
judgment was a lien, the preceding statutes necessarily implied
that such was the law. The case of Koning v. Bayard, 14 Fed.
